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Foundations Without Foundationalism, A Case for Second-Order Logic (Ox-
ford University Press, Oxford, 1991), by Stewart Shapiro, is an excellent book,
covering of all of the main results in second-order logic and its applications
to mathematical theories. Its main theme is that rst-order logic does not
adequately codify the descriptive and deductive components of actual mathe-
matical practice, and that rst-order languages and semantics are also inad-
equate models of mathematics(43). Second-order logic (under its standard
semantics), Shapiro maintains, provides better models of important aspects of
mathematics, both now and in recent history, than rst-order logic does (v);
and in that regard it is second-order, and not only rst-order, logic that has an
important role to play in foundational studies (ibid.). Indeed, the restriction
of logic to rst-order logic (without Skolem relativism) in such studies is the
main target of this book(196).
The book is divided into three parts, with Part I containing a discussion of
the philosophy of logic and the role of logic in foundational studies. In Part
II, a technical development of second-order logic is given in which it is argued
that higher-order notions are well-suited for modelling important aspects of
mathematics (x). Additional philosophical issues relevant to the acceptance
of second-order logic are given in Part III, as well as a coverage of some of the
history of these issues in the early part of this century.
1 Full Logics
By a full logic, Shapiro means a [formal] language, together with a deduc-
tive system and a semantics (3) where the language is taken as a model of
a fragment of ordinary natural language considered as a natural language of
mathematics. Given a set K of nonlogical symbols (individual, function, and
predicate constants), the main full logics considered here are L1K=, rst-order
logic with identity, and L1K, rst-order logic without identity, respectively 
as based on the symbols in K (with ! for the material conditional, : for clas-
sical negation, 8 for universal quantication, and 9 and other truth-functional
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connectives dened in the usual way). L2K  is L1K= extended to contain
predicate and function variables of di¤erent degrees, but no quantiers binding
these; and L2K is L1K similarly extended, but with quantiers binding predi-
cate and function variables as well as individual variables. (Identity is primitive
in L2K , but dened in L2K as indiscernibility.) Standarddeductive sys-
tems, D1= and D1 are described for the rst-order logics L1K= and L1K,
and deductive systems D2  and D2 extending D1= and D1 are described for
L2K  and L2K, respectively. Having no bound predicate and function vari-
ables, D2  has no comprehension principle, but it does have a substitution rule
(to infer [R=	(hxin)] from ).
The distinctive new axiom schemes for D2 are (1) the full impredicative
comprehension principle, (CP), for concepts (including relational concepts),
9Xn8hxin(Xnhxin  hxin);
which (for Xn not free in ) says, in e¤ect, that every formula of L2K deter-
mines an n-ary concept (for each positive integer n), (2) a similar principle for
functions (taken primitively, but which could be eliminated in favor many-one
relational concepts), and (3) an axiom of choice.
No justication or explanation otherwise is given as to why an axiom of
choice is considered a logical truth of second-order logic though its validation
is automatic in the authors metalanguage ZFC, Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory,
ZF , with an axiom of choice, C. The result of dropping the axiom of choice from
D2, called D2, is what some writers (including this reviewer) call standard
(impredicative) second-order logic in the syntactical, as opposed to the set-
theoretic, semantical sense. (It is also usually assumed that primitive functions
have been eliminated inD2 in favor of many-one relations, thereby reducing the
system to a formal logic of predication in which functionality is not represented
as a separate category.) It is this system that is equivalent to the second-order
logic of Freges Begri¤sschrift, and it is in this sense that we can say that Frege
was the rst to develop not only standardrst-order logic (as a proper part
of his Begri¤schrift system), but also standard second-order logic as well.
Shapiro does not discuss this system, and no explanation is given of why Frege
thought that the system embodied all of the fundamental laws of logic(other
than his law for the extensions of concepts). The main reason for ignoring the
system, apparently, is that it falls far short of determining all of the logical
truths (or all of the valid arguments) of second-order logic under its so-called
standardset-theoretical semantics. (But then so does D2 as well.)
The semantics of the full logics L1K and L1K= is based on set-theoretic
structures called models. In particular, a model for L1K and L1K= is a 2-tuple
hd; Ii, where d (called the domain, or universe, of discourse of the model) is a
nonempty set, and I is a function (called an interpretation) assigning entities
constructed from dof the appropriate types to the nonlogical symbols in K.
The satisfaction in such a model of a rst-order formula by an assignment of
values drawn from d to the rst-order variables is understood in the usual way,
and the logical truth (or semantic validity) of a formula is its satisfaction in
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every model by all assignments in those models. The validity of an argument is
dened similarly.
The same set-theoretic models are taken as the standardmodels of L2K 
and L2K, only now the assignments of values to variables are extended to
predicate and function variables as well  namely, by assigning subsets of dn
(the set of n-tuples drawn from d) to n-place predicate variables, and functions
from dn to d to each n-place function variable. What makes this semantics
standard for L2K and L2K  is that n-place predicate variables range over
the entire powerset of dn (as determined by Cantors theorem) and n-place
function variables range over all of the functions in dd
n
. Formulas are dened as
standardly valid, or as standard logical truths, if satised in every model by
all such assignments in those models, and the standard validityof arguments is
dened similarly. In standard semantics, Shapiro writes, by xing a domain
one thereby xes the range of both the rst-order variables and the second-
order variables(73) as determined in the set-theoretic metalanguage by the
Cantorian notion of powerset.
In the Henkin, or so-called nonstandard, semantics for L2K and L2K ,
the models for L1K and L1K  are qualied in the range of values of the
predicate and function variables. In particular, a Henkin model is a 4-tuple
hd;D; F; Ii in which, for each n, D(n) is a nonempty set of subsets of dn, F (n)
is a nonempty set of functions from dn to d, and d and I are as before (except
that what I assigns to n-place predicate and function constants in K must be
restricted to D(n) and F (n), respectively). It is now just D(n), and not the
full Cantorian powerset of dn, that is the range of the values of the n-place
predicate variables; and, similarly, it is F (n), and not dd
n
, that is the range of
values of the n-place function variables. No constraints are imposed on D(n)
and F (n) other than that they be nonempty, but, as I have noted elsewhere,
even this condition can be dropped in the logic of natural realism, where n-place
predicate variables are taken to range over natural properties (for n = 1) and
relations (for n > 1) and where function variables are simply deleted. Whether
or not there are any natural properties or relations is a strictly empirical, and
not a logical matter; and, independently of such empirical considerations, there
could be natural properties, but no natural relations, or there could be natural
binary relations but no natural properties or n-ary natural relations, for n > 2,
and so on for other combinations as well. The logic of natural realism is in this
regard a free logic  i.e. a logic free of existential presuppositionswith
respect to the values of the bound predicate variables. Of course, this is not
the sort of semantics we are interested in for strictly mathematical theories, nor
for the analysis of intensional discourse or the semantics of natural language in
general.
In what Henkin called generalmodels, the sets D(n) and F (n) are con-
strained under the condition that all instances of the comprehension principle
for concepts and functions must be satised. If they are further constrained to
satisfy the axiom of choice as well, then the resulting models are what Shapiro
calls faithful to D2 (or D2 ). A special case of faithful models are the full
Henkin models in which D(n) is the full Cantorian power-set of dn and F (n)
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is dd
n
, which are equivalent to the so-called standardmodels hd; Ii. The se-
mantics of standardmodels, in other words, amounts to a special case of the
semantics of Henkin models, and the standardsemantics of L2K amounts to
a restriction on the more general Henkin semantics of L2K. The price of the
restriction, as Shapiro observes (though only in the terminology of standard
semantics), is (1) that no deductive system can be complete with respect to it
(i.e. under the standard semantics), (2) that the (upward and downward)
Löwenheim-Skolem theorems fail for it, and (3) that it is not compact for L2K
(86f).
With respect to general and faithful models, on the other hand, Henkin
showed that the deductive systems D2 and D2 are sound, complete, compact,
and satisfy the Löwenheim-Skolem theorems just as D1= is sound, complete,
compact, and satises the Löwenheim-Skolem theorems with respect to the rst-
order semantics for L1K=. The problem, Shapiro argues, is that in the case of
non-full Henkin models, this semantics involves a restriction on the notion of
all subsets of d, the domain of discourse, as values of monadic predicate vari-
ables, and, similarly, a restriction on the notion of all subsets of dn (or all n-ary
relations in the set-theoretic sense) as values of the n-place predicate variables
(and a similar restriction in the case of the values of function variables). For
Shapiro, once a domain (for the rst-order variables) is xed, there is a rea-
sonably clear and unambiguous understanding of such locutions as all relations
[in the set-theoretic sense] or all subsets thereof (204)  as determined in
the metalanguage by the Cantorian notion of powerset, even in the case of an
innite domain.
The reason for this insistent reminder that the Cantorian notion of powerset
is involved in Shapiros notion of all subsets of an innite domain is that, as
Shapiro himself observes, there are logicians for whom there is no clear under-
standing of the totality of the subsets of d (i.e. the powerset of d) (247) in
the case of an innite domain, as understood under Cantors powerset theorem.
The independence results in set theory suggest this. The powerful axioms of
ZFC do not su¢ ce to x the powerset of the set of natural numbers, the sim-
plest innite powerset (ibid.). There is, moreover, an alternative framework
(or really several such) based on what I have called Freges double-correlation
thesis in which Cantors powerset theorem, at least as applied to the total uni-
verse of discourse, is refuted, and yet in which second-order statements of the
form, 8X9Y 8Z, which Shapiro takes as expressing our grasp of the locution
all subsets(247), are meaningful.1 In this framework, it is concepts, and not
sets, or subsetsof a domain, that are taken as the values of predicate vari-
ables, and classes (to the extent they are admitted at all) are assumed, as Frege
put it, to have their being in the concepts whose extensions they are, and not
(as on the Cantorian, iterative notion of set) in their members. A set-theoretic
semantics for such a framework which, because concepts are not sets, cannot
but be semantics from an external point of view cannot be based on the
1See Cantors Power-Set Theorem Versus Freges Double-Correlation Thesis", History and
Philosophy of Logic, 13 (1992), 179-201.
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Cantorian notion of the subsets of d (or of the subsets of dn), the domain of
discourse, as values of the (n-place) predicate variables, except at best in the
sense of a conceptual manque in place of the role of concepts. It is just in the
sense of such a conceptual manque that the sets in D (n) and F (n) of a Henkin
model are to be understood.
A set-theoretic (and therefore strictly external) semantics corresponding
to this approach is described by Shapiro (who notes (24) that it is close to a
semantics described elsewhere by this reviewer2). On this semantics for L2K
(and L2K ), which Shapiro calls rst-order semantics (a terminology that
this reviewer nds misleading and question-begging3), a model is a 4-tuple
hd; d1; d2; hI; p; aii, in which d (the domain of discourse, or range of values of
rst-order variables) is a nonempty set, I is an interpretation function assign-
ing items constructed from d(74) to the symbols in K; and, for each n, d1 (n)
and d2 (n) are nonempty ranges of values for the n-place predicate and function
variables, respectively; and, also for each n, p (n) is a subset of dn  d1 (n) and
a (n) is a function from dn  d2 (n) to d. (The idea is that p (n) is the interpre-
tation of the n-place predicationrelation and a (n) is the interpretation of the
n-place applicationfunction.) A Henkin model hd;D; F; Ii, as Shapiro notes,
simply is the rst-order model hd; d1; d2; hI; p; qii such that d1 is D, and F is
the realapplication function from the various F (n) and dn to d (75). In
short, Henkin semantics and rst-order semantics are pretty much the same
(76), regardless whether or not additional constraints, such as satisfaction of
the comprehension principle, are imposed on them.4
As construed by Shapiro, Henkin and rst-ordersemantics are nonstan-
dardbecause the range of the predicate variables varies from model to model,
even if the range of the rst-order variables is held xed(173); and, therefore,
according to Shapiro, whereas in standardsemantics, predication, or mem-
bership, is logical (6), in Henkin and rst-order semantics, predication or
membership is nonlogical as determined of course by the set-theoretic meta-
language based on the Cantorian notion of powerset. In other words, as the
membership relation characterized by the Cantorian notion of set and powerset,
predication, according to Shapiro, is a logical relation, whereas any purported
predication relation that is not in accord with the Cantorian notion is nonlog-
ical. The idea is that expressions for logical concepts (including predication or
membership) have a xed interpretation (with respect to the set-theoretic back-
2Predication versus membership in the distinction between logic as language and logic
as calculus", Synthesé, 77 (1988), 37-72, especially section 6. The models of this paper go
beyond Shapiros version by including a set of possible worlds and a Fregean correlation of
concepts with objects in the domain, which is used to interpret nominalized predicates as
abstract singular terms.
3Standard second-order semantics can be formulated in rst-order set theory no less so
than Henkin or this so-called rst-order semantics, and therefore, from that perspective,
each can be viewed as representing a muti-sorted rst-order logic no les so, or more so, than
the other.
4 It should be noted, however, that these so-called rst-order models can be extended
to modal and intentional contexts (with or without nominalized predicates as abstract singu-
lar terms) in which even necessarily co-extensive concepts might not be identical. Such an
extension does not seem possible for Henkin models.
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ground), and that, relative to this xed interpretation, the invariance of logical
truth (or validity) is determined only by what is invariant across all domains of
discourse. It is for this reason Shapiro can claim that in xing a domain one
thereby xes the range of both the rst-order variables and the second-order
variables(73) as determined by the Cantorian notion of powerset and that
[t]here is no further interpreting to be done(ibid.).
On the alternative, so-called nonstandard, view, which is really based on
the priority of concepts over classes, the invariance of logical truth (or validity) is
an invariance not only with respect to all domains, but also with respect to all of
the ways of conceptually structuring those domains as determined by the laws of
compositionality for concept-formation (which is also where the role of the xed
interpretation of logical constants comes in). It is concepts, and not sets, that
are predicable entities (and that underlie the correct use of predicate expressions
and predication in language), and the primary constraint that has to be imposed
on any externalset-theoretic modeling of such predicable entities is that the
laws of compositionality for concept-formation (which is represented here by the
comprehension principle, (CP)) must be satised in all such models (i.e. that
the models be generalin Henkins sense). It is this notion of logical truth (or
validity) that coincides with Freges laws of logic in his Begri¤sschrift, and
that coincides with provability (or deductive consequence) in D2, and which
therefore is compact and satises the Löwenheim-Skolem theorems.
The main drawback on these results, Shapiro notes, is that no theory with
an innite Henkin model is what may be called Henkin-categorical(95), i.e.
second-order languages with Henkin (or rst-order) semantics are not adequate
to characterize innite structures up to isomorphism (ibid.)  assuming, to
begin with, that innite structures can be characterized up to isomorphism
(and are not subject to Skolem relativism).
2 Second-Order Versus First-Order Logic
Categoricity is an important component in Shapiros argument for second-order
logic under its standardsemantics and against rst-order logic. For example,
where A = f0; s;+; g, rst-order arithmetic based on L1A= (and consisting of
successor, addition, and multiplication axioms, and an induction schema) is not
categorical, i.e. not all models of rst-order arithmetic are isomorphic. By com-
parison, all models of second-order arithmetic, AR, consisting of the conjunction
of the successor, addition, and multiplication axioms, and the induction axiom,
8X[(X0 ^ 8x(Xx! Xsx))! 8xXx];
which is a formula of L2A, are isomorphic with respect to the standard
semantics of L2A. Similarly, rst-order real analysis based on L1B, where
B = f0; 1;+; ;g, is not categorical, i.e. not all of models of rst-order real
analysis are isomorphic; and yet, based on L2B, all models of second-order real
analysis, AN , which has a second-order axiom of completeness, are isomorphic
under the standardsemantics of L2B.
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The language of set theory has the membership symbol, 2, as its only non-
logical constant. Where Z2 is the conjunction of the rst-order axioms of ZF ,
Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, and the second-order axiom of replacement,
8f8x9y8z(z 2 y  9w(w 2 x ^ z = fw));
then the result of adding Z2 to D2 is a deductive system equivalent to Morse-
Kelly set theory. As Shapiro observes, ifM is a standardmodel of Z2, thenM
is isomorphic to an inaccessible rank, which means that if M1 and M2 are both
standardmodels of Z2, and M1 is not isomorphic to M2, then one of them
is isomorphic to an initial segmentof the other(86), a result indicating that,
unlike rst-order set theory, second-order set theory is almost categorical.
The second-order theories of arithmetic and set theory are not conservative
extensions of their rst-order counterparts. In particular, a truth denition
for the rst-order theories can be formulated in the second-order theories, and
thus one can prove the consistency of the rst-order theories with respect to
their second-order counterparts. More importantly, there are nonstandard
models of the following sets of rst-order formulas:
AR  1 : f :  is a rst-order formula of AR and j= AR! g;
AN   1 : f :  is a rst-order formula of AN and j= AN ! g;
Z2  1 : f :  is a rst-order formula of Z2 and j= Z2! g;
which means that there are uncountable models of AR   1, countable models
of AN   1, and countable models of Z2   1. This is the situation known as
Skolems paradox, which is a consequence of the fact that, unlike their second-
order counterparts, the rst-order theories of arithmetic, real analysis, and set
theory are not categorical.
There are notions other than categoricity that are also indicative of the
di¤erence between the expressive powers of second-order and rst-order logic.
There is a second-order formula, INF (X), for example, that asserts there is a
one-to-one correspondence from X to a proper part of the extension of X, i.e.
that X is (Dedekind) innite, in which case FIN (X), dened as :INF (X),
says that X is nite. Both of these are formulas of the pure second-order lan-
guage L2, and they are satised only in models having an innite, or nite,
domain, respectively. The negations of rst-order formulas that are satised
only in an innite domain do not similarly guarantee that a domain in which
they are satised must be nite. The notion of nitude, in other words, can-
not be captured in a rst-order language, any rst-order language(101), and
yet, as Shapiro notes, [f]initude is a widely used notion, occurring throughout
mathematics(102), which means that the language used to formalize mathe-
matical practice should be capable of expressing this notion(ibid.), and hence
at least second-order.
Other cardinality notions, such as the cardinality of X being less than or
equal to the cardinality of Y , and the cardinality of X being equal to the
cardinality of Y , are also expressible in the pure second-order language L2,
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which means that the Schröder-Bernstein theorem can be stated in L2 and, as
Shapiro notes, proved inD2 (andD2 as well) (102f). The notion of being count-
able is expressible in L2 in terms of the notions of nitude and equi-cardinality,
and being denumerably innite is then expressible in terms of being countable
and innite, which then can be used to express being ALEPH-0, and so on
to ALEPH-1, ALEPH-2, etc. The continuum hypothesis, CH, can be formu-
lated in L2, the language of pure second-order logic, and, as Shapiro notes, the
following sentence,
NCH : 8X(ALEPH   1(X)! :CONTINUUM (X));
is logically true (under the standardsemantics) if, and only if, the continuum
hypothesis is false, and therefore either CH or NCH is logically true (under
the standard semantics). On the other hand, standard forcing techniques
have been applied to second-order set theory using Henkin models, showing that
neither CH nor NCH (nor their negations) can be deduced in D2 (or D2) from
Z2 (second-order ZF ), and therefore neither can be deduced from D2 (or D2)
alone. This situation, Shapiro observes, is an instance of the incompleteness
of second-order logic. One of CH, NCH is an unprovable logical truth(105)
that is, logically true in the sense of the standardsemantics.
The notion of the well-foundedness of a relational concept E can be expressed
in L2 in terms of a pure second-order formula,
8X[9xXx! 9x(Xx ^ 8y(Xy ! :Eyx))];
but, as noted by Shapiro, it cannot be characterized in a rst-order framework
(108). Similarly, the notion of a well-ordering R of the instances of a concept
X, WO(R;X), can also be expressed in L2, and yet [t]here is no adequate
formulation of this notion in a rst-order language except in the trivial cases in
which the extension of X has a xed nite bound on its cardinality (106) 
the reason for this being the compactness of rst-order logic. The compactness
of D2 and D2 does not a¤ect the characterization in L2 of well-foundedness,
however; nor does it a¤ect the expressibility of the well-ordering principle,
WOP : 8X9R(WO(R;X));
as a pure second-order formula of L2. But then, despite the presence of a global
axiom of choice, AC, in D2, a faithful Henkin model for D2 shows that WOP
is not a theorem of D2. The converse does hold, however; in particular, it can
be shown that WOP ! AC is provable in D2 (107f).
A common mathematical practice noted by Shapiro is the denition of a set
in terms of closure conditions on an initial or basic set B and a collection H
of operations or relations; e.g., M is the minimal closure of B under H if M
is the smallest set containing B and closed under the operations and relations
in H. Dedekinds denition of the natural numbers is by means of a minimal
closure, and so is Freges denition in terms of the ancestral of the predecessor
relation. Indeed, the proofs of categoricity of AR and AN are based on several
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such minimal closures. As Shapiro notes, the notion of an object x being in the
minimal closure of a concept Y under a relation R can be expressed in L2 as
follows:
MC(x; Y;R) : 8X[(8y(Y y ! Xy) ^ 8y8z((Xy ^Ryz)! Xz))! Xx]:
That such a minimal closure exists can be proved in D2 by means of an (im-
predicative) instance of the comprehension principle, (CP),
9Z8x(Zx MC(x; Y;R)):
For rst-order logic, on the other hand, it can be shown by means of a com-
pactness argument that no collection of rst-order formulas can successfully
characterize any non-trivial minimal closure (99), which is further evidence,
Shapiro notes, that rst-order languages are inadequate(ibid.).
Note, however, that the minimal closure that can be proved to exist with
respect to a concept Y and relation R is only a concept and not a set as the
correlate or extension of the concept. This is important because in set theory,
which is the basis of Shapiros standardmodels, such minimal closures gener-
ally turn out to be too bigto exist as sets, as opposed to proper (or ultimate)
classes (which, in e¤ect, amount to concepts that have no sets corresponding
to them). The construction of an appropriate set then has to be done locally
inside one of the values of Xin the denition of minimal closure. This is not
the case in the alternative frameworks mentioned in section one, where Cantors
powerset theorem is disproved and the Boolean structure of concepts holds not
only for concepts (as values of predicate variables) but also for their extensions
(as values of rst-order variables) as well.
In such a alternative framework, nominalized predicate expressions are al-
lowed to occur as abstract singular terms  the way they are in type theory,
except in this case predicates are not typed (other than in the sense of their
degree or ad-icity), and, assuming extensionality (Freges basic law Va), they
denote not the concepts that predicates stand in their functional role as pred-
icates, but the extensions (or intensions, if extensionality is dropped) of those
concepts instead. Cantors powerset theorem is expressed in such a framework
in either of several equivalent forms, but any one of which must have a nomi-
nalized predicate occurring as an abstract singular term such as the simplest
version, which is formulated as follows:
CT : 8R[R is many   one ! 9X(8x[Xx! 9yR(x; y)] ^ :9xR(x;X))]:
This is noteworthy because Shapiro claims that Cantors theorem can be ex-
pressed in L2, where predicates occur only as predicates and not also as abstract
singular terms. Shapiros formulation is
8R9X8x9y[(R(x; y) ^ :Xy) _ (:R(x; y) ^Xy)];
which does have a supercial similarity to Cantors theorem, but which also is
trivially equivalent to 8R9X8x9y[Xy  :R(x; y)]. This last formula, however,
is derivable from
8R9X8x[Xx  :R(x; x)];
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an instance of the comprehension principle, (CP), and therefore it is provable
in D2. But D2 (extended to include nominalized predicates as abstract sin-
gular terms) is the underlying logic of these alternatives (known as HST  and
HST  ) where the above and other equivalent versions of Cantors theorem are
refuted (directly in HST  and in slightly modied forms in HST  ). In other
words, given the refutation of the most explicit versions of Cantors theorem in
a framework having D2 as its underlying logic (and equiconsistent with weak
Zermelo set theory or the theory of simple types), the comprehension principle
of D2 (with or without nominalized predicates as abstract singular terms) can-
not really be said to contain Cantors theorem as an instance, contrary to what
Shapiro claims on this matter.
3 The Rejection of Epistemological Foundation-
alism
By foundationalism, Shapiro means the view that it is possible and desirable
to reconstruct each (legitimate) branch of mathematics on a completely secure
basis, one that is maximally immune to rational doubt (25). This is an epis-
temological doctrine, and as such, Shapiro observes, it has few proponents
today, and for good reason(vi), which is why he urges a thorough rejection
of foundationalism (ibid.). In particular, it is his view that just as we have
learned to live with uncertainty in virtually every special subject, we can live
with uncertainty in logic and foundations of mathematics, and we can live well
(25).
Two foundationalist e¤orts discussed by Shapiro are logicism, especially as
held by Frege and Russell, and Hilberts formalist program, for which only a
certain nitarycore of mathematics is meaningful, even though most branches
go well beyond this (28). Frege did maintain a certain form of epistemologi-
cal foundationalism, but, as Shapiro himself notes, he also had an ontological
orientation as well(54) in which numbers in particular are logical objects
namely, classes that have their being in the concepts whose extensions they are,
as opposed to sets in the Cantorian sense. In general, an ontological foundation-
alism need not be committed to an epistemological foundationalism, and, as in
conceptual realism, one might adopt something like a Fregean approach without
assuming epistemological foundationalism.5 Russell, incidentally, did not argue
for certainty in logic and mathematics, but maintained instead that [o]ur rea-
sons for believing logic and pure mathematics are, in part, only inductive and
probable in spite of the fact that, in their logical order, the propositions of logic
and pure mathematics follow from the premises of logic by pure deduction.6
The main point about logicism is that the pure formal language of logic
5A brief description of conceptual realism is given in the article cited in footnote 1. A more
detailed version is described in Conceptual realism versus Quine on classes and higher-order
logic," Synthese 90 (1992), 379-436, especially section 8.
6Logical Atomism" (1924), reprinted in Logic and Knowledge, edited by R.C. Marsh,
London: George Allen and Unwin LTD, 1956, p.326.
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which always is at least second-order and has nominalized predicates as ab-
stract singular terms either on a par with other singular terms as values of the
rst-order variables (as in Freges case, and as originally conceived by Russell
as well), or, as in type theory, as values only of predicate variables of the same
logical type is a completely interpreted language that can be applied to any
subject matter whatsoever. Such a logical language is to contain not only a
calculus ratiocinator, i.e. a deductive system, but a lingua characteristica as
well, i.e. a language for all rational, scientic discourse. There is no inde-
pendent metatheory (28), Shapiro notes, of such a view of logic as language
 but that does not mean that an external set-theoretic semantics (and in
particular a Henkin or rst-ordersemantics) cannot be used as a guide in the
determination of logical truth or validity.
Neither logicism nor formalism were successful as foundationalist programs.
In logicism, in particular, classes in the logical sense (i.e. as extensions of
concepts), gave way to classes in the mathematical sense, i.e. sets in the sense
of the iterative hierarchy as based on Cantors theorem. But, aside from the
independent development of set theory by mathematicians, that was mainly
because of the contradiction in Freges theory as a result of Russells paradox
on the one hand, and because of the unnaturalness of type theory as a model
of natural language on the other. It was not, in other words, because of any
epistemological doctrine associated with logicism. (Freges logic, incidentally,
can be reconstructed in terms of either of the systems HST  and HST  , which
do provide natural models of natural language, but which also can serve as a
foundation for conceptual realism.) In any case, logicism certainly cannot be
accused of psychologism, the view that the aim of logic is to characterize a
certain kind of subjective certainty (31). Indeed, Shapiro notes that [m]ost
foundationalist authors reject psychologism,and claim instead that logic deals
with objective norms of actual correct inference (ibid.). This need not mean
that every deducible argument in the logicists system corresponds to a correct
inference in natural language; for, as a complex inferential engine the system
may validate arguments that do not arise in natural language except under the
articial conditions of a formal system. But the question whether the system
is exhaustive in the sense that every correct inference of the natural language
corresponds to a deducible argument in the formal language (33) is another
matter.
According to Shapiro, if logicism were either (1) to make a concession to
psychologism and assert that the inferences that correspond to the deducible
arguments all seem certain, or are obvious, or (2) postulate a faculty of nor-
mative epistemic judgement, a faculty outside the purview of psychology, then,
it cannot assure us that the system is exhaustive(ibid.). On the other hand,
if the logicist can live with the possibility that the deductive system may have
to be expanded one day, that would be an incompleteness of sorts(34). Such
an incompleteness could be with respect to an expanded categorial analysis
of natural language, however, i.e. in the recognition over time of new logical
categories corresponding to certain types of expressions of natural language, so
that certain correct inferences of natural language that could not be explained
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before come to be covered under the expanded theory of logical forms. Whether
ultimately such a process of extending the theory of logical forms must result in
an exhaustive system is a question that can be left open, subject to further
assumptions and investigations of natural language. In any case, the logicist
need not agree that the incompletenessin question is a result of what Shapiro
calls standard semantics, i.e. that the system is committed to completely
representing the standard logical truths of set-theoretic semantics as based
on the Cantorian notion of powerset.
For Shapiro there are today two conceptions or orientations toward mod-
ern logic(35), namely, the foundational and the semantic conceptions. On the
foundational conception one gives axioms and rules of inference for deducing
theorems, and logic is seen as the ideal of what may be called relative justi-
cation, the process of coming to know some proposition on the basis of others
(36). This sort of enterprise, according to Shapiro, is a limited version of logi-
cism(ibid.), where the implicit assumption is that our pre-theoretic ability to
detect correct justication su¢ ces to sanction counterparts of each immediate
inference (37). On the semantic conception, on the other hand, validity is
characterized in terms of models or interpretations of the language in question
(ibid.). Admittedly, this characterization depends on the distinction between
logical and nonlogical constants (and hence on an implicit theory of logical form,
such as is proposed in logicism?). Following Tarski, Shapiro thinks that this dis-
tinction need not be determined in advance of logical theory, and may hold
for a natural language only relative to a model-theoretic semantics for a formal
language that corresponds to it(39). In other words, on this conception, the
plausibility of a proposed semantics depends on the extent to which the class of
models corresponds to the intuitive notion of interpretationor possible world,
the one active in pre-formal judgements of validity(ibid.).
One could adopt both a foundational and a semantic conception (and achieve
a marriageof sorts) as opposed to adopting one and rejecting the other in
frameworks where there is a convergence on a single consequence relation (as in
second-order logic under Henkin or rst-ordersemantics). Shapiro, however,
opts for accepting the semantic conception and rejecting the foundational view.
His main argument for this is that the extension of the notion of ideal justi-
cationmay be open-ended(44), i.e. one should admit the possibility that
we may one day discover arguments that conform to foundational standards of
ideal justication, but have counterparts in [the given formal language] L that
are not deducible in the deductive system. ... This is consonant with the es-
sential incompleteness of the logic(ibid.). But this essential incompleteness
could be the result only of an incomplete categorial analysis of the logical
forms underlying natural language, where the counterparts in L that are not
deducible are the best we could do as analyses of those arguments, and not
because the so-called standardmodels of set theory provide the true and
correctinterpretation of natural language. The convergence on a single con-
sequence relation would then be only for that part of natural language covered
by the logical forms adequately represented in the formal language L.
Shapiro rejects the extreme opposite of foundationalism, which would make
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justication completely subordinate to semantics (48). Instead, he adopts a
middle course in which we keep an intuitivenotion of justication and use it
to guide our theorizing, both semantic and deductive, and to evaluate deductive
systems(ibid.), which seems a very reasonable approach. It should be noted,
however, that although [t]here is no problem here with justication being laden
with theory, even being laden with set theory (ibid.), it is not clear that the
membership relation of set theory, as based on the Cantorian notion of powerset,
can be the criterion by which to judge an adequate semantics for predication in
natural language.
The way to understand natural language, including the informal discourse
of mathematics, Shapiro agrees, is through the Use Thesis, which is a thesis
not about meaning or semantics but about understanding. The idea is that one
understands the concepts embodied in a language to the extent that one knows
how to use the language correctly(211). That is, the ability to use a language
constitutes understanding and thus grasping the concepts (ibid.). Indeed, in
conceptualism, concepts are none other than the cognitive capacities, or cogni-
tive structures otherwise based upon such capacities, that constitute our ability
to use the di¤erent types of expressions of natural language. Thus, predicable
concepts, for example, are cognitive structures based upon intersubjectively re-
alizable capacities to identify, characterize, and relate objects in various ways;
it is these concepts that underlie our ability to follow the rules of language in
the use of predicate expressions. Indeed, strictly speaking, our knowledge of the
rules of language is not propositional knowledge (knowledge-that), but knowl-
edge in the sense of having concepts as cognitive capacities; and our following
those rules in particular speech acts is just a matter of our exercising those
concepts as cognitive capacities. It is concepts in this sense that are values of
the predicate variables in conceptualism, and not sets.
Though Shapiro refers to concepts in his description of the Use Thesis, he
takes only sets and never concepts as the values of predicate variables. Predi-
cable concepts do have extensions (or at least most do), which can be taken as
their surrogates in model-theoretic semantics. That is, as the determinant for
the correct use of a predicate expression in di¤erent contexts (and thereby of
the truth conditions for that expression), a predicable concept will in general
determine a class as its extension (in such a context), and that class may then
be taken as a proxy for the concept (as, e.g. in Henkin semantics). But it is
an enormous jump from this notion of a class as the extension of a concept
to the notion of a set as determined by Cantors powerset theorem. Indeed,
in conceptual realism (as represented in HST  or HST  ), where nominalized
predicates are allowed to occur as abstract singular terms, and where (assuming
extensionality) such nominalized predicates denote the extensions of the con-
cepts that predicates stand for in their role as predicates, Cantors theorem is
refuted (as already noted in section one).
The Use Thesis, Shapiro claims, does not demand an anti-realist ontol-
ogy nor a non-model-theoretic semantics (212), contrary to what Dummett
has claimed on its basis instead. Certainly, it does not demand anti-realism in
conceptual realism at least not in regard to the classes (i.e. extensions, or
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intensions if the extensionality axiom is rejected) that nominalized predicates
are assumed to denote (as values of the rst-order variables)  which is a para-
digmatic framework for the Use Thesis. (Concepts do not exist independently of
the human capacity for concept-formation, however, and perhaps in this sense
the framework can be said to be anti-realist in regard to the values of pred-
icate variables.) And model-theoretic semantics is acceptable so long as the
models are appropriately constrained in accordance with the laws of composi-
tionality for concept-formation (the way they are in generalHenkin models).
Given the Use Thesis, Shapiro observes, all that follows is that the ontology
and truth conditions of semantics must be compatible with the learnability and
understanding of a language through its use. Truth conditions should not be
that far removed from the knowledge implicit in the correct use of a language,
and from whatever it is that one learns when acquiring facility with a language.
There should be a natural (if not inevitable) link between use and truth con-
ditions(ibid.). But, again, it is a very big jump from the concepts (and their
extensions) presupposed by the Use Thesis to the set-theoretic models of stan-
dardsemantics as based on the Cantorian notion of powerset, and which is the
basis of the categoricity results favored by Shapiro.
Indeed, Shapiro goes so far as to propose that, on the Use Thesis, Skolemite
relativism is to be rejected out of hand(213), and that the use of mathematical
discourse ... is not captured by rst-order languages or e¤ective deductive sys-
tems, namely the sense in which the discourse outstrips, or even transcends, its
previous manifestations (ibid.). Certainly, in conceptual realism, rst-order
languages are not adequate to capture important aspects of the use of the rel-
evant languages(ibid.), at least not with respect to the concepts presupposed
by that use, i.e. the concepts that are the basis of predication in any use of
language (and for whatever purpose). But being at most potentially innite
(i.e. countable), such concepts cannot be the basis of any categoricity results
for innite domains; and if classes are assumed to have their being in the con-
cepts whose extensions they are, then, rather than reject Skolemite relativism,
the Use Thesis is committed to it but in a form appropriate to second-order
logic under its Henkin or rst-ordersemantics. Semantics, as Shapiro himself
admits, comes after the original natural language of mathematics is under-
stood, and the original understanding does not consist of grasping a model,
intended or otherwise(213), such as that of the natural or real numbers. Un-
derstanding the language is knowing how to use it(ibid.), which suggests that
the Use Thesis, especially as developed in conceptual realism, provides a con-
ceptual or philosophical rationale for Skolemite relativism, rather than a reason
for rejecting it.
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4 Will the Real Logical Classes (Sets?) Please
Stand Up
An important component of Shapiros standardsemantics is what he calls the
logical notion of set, by which he means the notion of a subset of a universe of
discourse in the Cantorian sense, and not the logical notion of a class as the
extension of a concept. To be sure, logical sets are like classes in the logical sense
in that, unlike iterative sets, both exemplify what may be called a Boolean
structure(177), i.e. both have complements and there is a universal setor
class. The main di¤erence is that whereas Cantors theorem is assumed to hold
for logical sets, it fails to hold for classes in the logical sense (as represented in
HST  or HST  ).
Another di¤erence has to do with the fact that [t]here are no logical sets
simpliciter, only logical sets within a given context(18) because, according
to Shapiro, the word setis like an indexical expression of ordinary language
(ibid.). This way of phrasing the issue cannot be right as it stands, however,
because otherwise there would be no him, her, them, I, thou, or us, simpliciter ;
that is, it cannot be right because, as just expressed, we are objects referred
to by indexical expressions, and yet we exist regardless of whether or not those
expressions are used in a di¤erent context to refer to other people. Objects do
not just pop into being when referred to by an indexical expression, and then
pop out of being when the context is changed and the expression is used to refer
to a di¤erent object. Indexicality simply does not have that kind of ontic e¤ect
or signicance.
The point about indexicality, according to Shapiro, is that a logical set is
a subclass of a universe of discourse, which means that it always involves a
domain xed by context(177). Putting it this way comes very close to what is
meant in conceptualism by the claim that reference to the subsets of a domain
of discourse of a set-theoretic model, as opposed to reference to the concepts
that are internal to a theory regarding that domain, is at best reference with
respect to an external semantics, and that the iterative sets serving as proxies for
concepts in that external semantics cannot really be those concepts. Similarly,
just as the domain of a standardmodel cannot itself be a logical set, no
less the universal logical set (there being none simpliciter), but only an iterative
set going proxy for such, so, too, the subsets of that domain cannot be logical
sets(again, because there are none simpliciter), but only iterative sets serving
as proxies for such. Or, just as the domain of the model is not universal with
respect to the metatheory, so, too, none of the subsets of that domain have
complements with respect to the set theory of the metalanguage. Thus, just
as one might say there are no concepts simpliciter, other than the concepts
that can be realized within the context of a theory (of ordinary or scientic
language), so too there are no logical sets simpliciter, only logical sets within
a given theory(177).
So much for similarity, however, because a crucial di¤erence remains. In
particular, logical sets, even if only taken as values of predicate variables within
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a theoretical context, are objects, whereas concepts, as rule-following cognitive
capacities, are not objects but unsaturated cognitive structures in a sense anal-
ogous to, but not the same as, what Frege meant by an unsaturated function.7
That is, as rule-following cognitive capacities that can be realized in a theoret-
ical context (of ordinary or scientic language), concepts can be exercised by
di¤erent people at the same time, as well as by the same person at di¤erent
times or, they may, relative to that theoretical context, never in fact be exer-
cised at all. It is this nonoccuurent, or purely dispositional, status of concepts
as rule-following cognitive capacities that need not be exercised at any given
time, or even ever, in a given theoretical context that explains in part their
unsaturated nature, i.e. why concepts cannot be objects. Another part of that
explanation is that the exercise, or saturation, of such a capacity in a speech act
of the theoretical context in question is what informs that act with a predicable
nature, and it is this aspect of a concept that is the basis of predication in that
context.
Nothing at all like this holds for what Shapiro calls logical sets, and one
can only wonder what it is about them, or the logicalrelation of membership
with respect to them, that explains predication in language and thought. That
they are objects, and not, e.g., unsaturated functions from objects to truth
values, as in Freges theory, is implicit throughout this book. But, even if one
were now to assume otherwise, i.e. reconstrue logical sets as Fregean Begri¤e,
there would still be the problem of Cantors theorem; for, whereas Cantors
powerset theorem is assumed to hold for logical sets, the opposite is assumed
by Frege in terms of his double-correlation thesis. A similar observation applies
if one were to assume that logical sets are the extensions of Fregean Begri¤e
 or the extensions of concepts as cognitive capacities. In any case, Shapiro
would reject such a reconstrual as part of the foundational conception of
logic. The present study, he makes clear, eschews foundational questions,
such as whether the classes in the range of our second-order variables, and the
concomitant membership relation, are ultimately based on concepts, or whether
the classes are based on the iterative notion of set (20). And yet, as logical
sets, there really are no such classes simpliciter.
Although he admits that rst-order set theory provides a uniform seman-
tics for all (or almost all) formal languages (251), and that the notion of
second-order logical truth is set-theoretically denable (163)  indeed, that
the standardsemantics of second-order logic is not quite as rich and complex
as the notion of (rst-order) set-theoretic truth (ibid.) Shapiro is not also
willing to admit that logical sets are none other than the iterative sets of the
background rst-order set theory. This is because the semantics of rst-order
set theory cannot x the subject matter of the theory(252) i.e. the subject
matter in the sense of the standardmodels of second-order set theory, which,
7Freges Begri¤ e are really properties and relations of a form of logical realism, and not
the cognitive structures of conceptualism. Unlike concepts as cognitive structures, there is
no reason why there could not be uncountably many such independently real entities in such
a framework as values of the predicate variables (despite the fact that Cantors powerset
theorem remains refuted by Freges double-correlation thesis).
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at least internally, according to Shapiro, assumes that the values of the predi-
cate variables are logical sets. There are models [of rst-order set theory], for
example, in which the membership relation is not well-founded, and by hypoth-
esis, we have no principled way to rule outthe unintended ones(ibid.). The
result, in other words, is another variant of the Skolem paradox, now applied
to the background set theory(252), which then leads to an unavoidable rela-
tivity of virtually all mathematical notions(253), which Shapiro maintains is
not reected by mathematical practice. But, as based on the Use Thesis, it is
hard to see how mathematical practice can really settle this.
Another option is to regard the background rst-order set theory as having
an intended interpretation(253), just the way the natural number structure
and the real number structure are taken as the intended interpretations of
arithmetic and analysis. The fact that the background set theory has unintended
models is then taken as irrelevant, because (shades of logicism) the theory is
to be regarded as fully interpreted (ibid.). The problem with this option is
that it leaves as a mystery how the intended model is grasped, understood or
communicated,which is all the more perplexing since m [the intended model]
is so complex. Without an independent characterization ofm, it is not clear how
the language of set theory overcomes the problem with characterizing structures
in rst-order languages (254). It also leaves unexplained how predication in
the background theory is to be explained.
A nal option is to regard set theory as a regimented version of the natural
language of mathematics normally used as metalanguage, the mother tongue
of logical theory (ibid.). Such a regimented version can have an explicit
syntax and a uniform ontology, which can be employed without apology,
because [t]here is no perspective outside this language from which to discuss
its interpretations, or its models (ibid.). This option is unobjectionable,
according to Shapiro, because given the overriding anti-foundationalism, it
does not follow that second-order logic is undermined (255). That may be
true, but, by second-order logic, Shapiro means here only second-order logic as
characterized in standardmodels, where it is the Cantorian notion of subset
that interprets how one can speak coherently of all subsetsof d [the domain
of discourse] and all relationson d(ibid.) an interpretation that is based on
the logical notion of set, as opposed to the logical notion of class as the extension
of a concept underlying the use of the natural language of mathematics.
5 Concluding Remarks
There is a great wealth of material about second-order logic in this book, only
some of which we have touched on here. Chapter 6, for example, explains
in a clear and precise way the sense in which n-th-order logic, for n  3,
is reducible to second-order logic (134), and there is an excellent section on
reection principles and the realm of so-called small cardinals in the set-theoretic
hierarchy, as well as a section on large largecardinals. Three historical items
are taken up and discussed expertly in chapter 7; namely, (1) the emergence of
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rst-order logic (and semantics) as the standardin logic; (2) the development
of set theory and the emergence of rst-order ZFC; and (3) the contemporary
controversy over the status of second-order logic. A fascinating debate that
leads to a regress over the question of whether or not there is an unequivocal
understanding of all relationsor all subsetsis described in chapter 8. Overall,
it is really an excellent book, and, notwithstanding the philosophical and/or
conceptual di¤erence of opinion this reviewer has regarding the signicance of
standardas opposed to nonstandardsemantics for second-order logic, the
author is to be commended for a job well-done.
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